Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Within the Framework of China-Russian Cooperation

As an extension of the high-level strategic cooperation between China and Russia at the multilateral level, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become one of the most significant cross-regional international organizations in the contemporary global order. With the development and maturation of the SCO, the organization admitted India and Pakistan as full members in 2017, completed the second round of enlargement by admitting Iran in July 2023, and the third round of enlargement, which included Belarus, was also concluded in 2024. Throughout the SCO’s continuous expansion, it has paralleled the high-level development of China–Russia relations. The collective decisions reached through internal consultations among member states have ultimately been based on the premise that the high-level development of China–Russia relations ensures continued functioning of key regional cooperation mechanisms, including security cooperation, counter-terrorism coordination, economic collaboration and multilateral political consultation within the SCO.

Thus, this study focuses on the SCO’s inaugural membership expansion, the most representative case, to systematically analyze the preparatory processes for India and Pakistan’s inclusion and the Sino-Russian coordination that facilitated its success.

China-Russia cooperation within the SCO framework stems from the ‘Shanghai Five’ mechanism, driven by improved bilateral relations. On April 25, 1996, their heads of state declared a strategic partnership, leading to the ‘Shanghai Five’ formation. On April 26, 1996, leaders from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai. As trust grew through border disarmament negotiations, cooperation expanded beyond security to trade, politics and culture. In 2001, with the inclusion of Uzbekistan, the cooperation scale of the ‘Shanghai Five’ mechanism expanded, and the six countries jointly signed the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter’, marking the formal establishment of the SCO.

As founding members, China and Russia played a pivotal role in the SCO’s creation and development. They have deepened strategic cooperation, tackled security threats like terrorism and transnational crime, and advanced multilateral collaboration in the economy, energy and investment, contributing to regional stability and prosperity. Taking the first 20 years of SCO’s external trade development as an example, according to the ‘SCO 20-Year Trade Development Report’, the total trade volume of the SCO grew from $667.09 billion in 2001 to $6.06 trillion in 2020. Over these 20 years, the total trade volume among member states increased nearly 100-fold, with the proportion of global trade accounted for by the SCO member countries rising from 5.4% in 2001 to 17.5% in 2020, indicating a continual strengthening of the SCO’s influence on global trade. Among these figures, China and Russia have contributed the most to foreign trade. From 2001 to 2020, China’s foreign trade volume increased from $509.8 billion to $5.3 trillion^, , while Russia’s foreign trade increased from $104.832 billion to $571.9 billion. The two countries have always led the SCO’s foreign trade growth. Regarding internal cooperation within the SCO, the continuous growth of bilateral trade between China and Russia has provided strong momentum for regional economic cooperation. Bilateral trade between the two countries grew from $10.67 billion in 2001 to $107.76 billion in 2020. Despite the slowdown in global trade cooperation due to the pandemic and regional tensions, China–Russia trade still surpassed $200 billion in 2023, reaching $240.11 billion, a 26.3% year-on-year increase.

From this, the continued high-level development of China–Russia relations has been a driving force behind the political organization, rule design and subsequent expansion of SCO’s topics and cooperation scale. As the SCO grows, its commitment to openness and global influence make membership expansion inevitable for its development. From preparation to implementation, China–Russia coordination has been pivotal in this process.

Membership expansion, a common trajectory for international organizations, is an inevitable strategic choice for the SCO as it matures. The potential for enlargement has existed since its inception and was extensively deliberated among member states. Before its first expansion, the SCO conducted thorough strategic assessments and regulatory preparations, advancing through two distinct phases.

Inheriting the ‘Shanghai Five’ security mechanism, the SCO initially prioritized expanding cooperation and strengthening intra-organizational development among founding members, with Central Asia at its core, rather than pursuing membership expansion. Although the SCO introduced specific regulations for receiving observer states in 2004, the admission of the first four observer states in 2005 can be regarded as a transitional preparation for the opening of the expansion of the organization’s full membership. At the 2006 SCO Shanghai Summit, the Foreign Ministers’ Council agreed internally to prioritize ‘enhancing action efficiency and consolidating organizational structure’, suspending new observer and member admissions. This consensus persisted until late 2007.

In 2008, an expert group on SCO membership expansion was established at the Dushanbe Summit, with Russia playing a key role. The group developed guidelines on eligibility, entry procedures, and related mechanisms, resulting in the ‘SCO New Member Admission Regulations’, approved at the 2010 Tashkent Summit. These regulations defined membership qualifications and procedural issues. While the eight admission criteria still emphasized adherence to the organization’s ‘common legal results’, the clarified procedures provided a solid foundation for expansion.

Despite slow legal preparations and internal debates, SCO’s expansion stayed on course, driven by Russia’s support and China–Russia cooperation. This phase culminated in two documents from the 2014 Dushanbe Summit: ‘Procedures for Granting Member Status to New SCO Members’ and the revised ‘Memorandum of Obligations for Applicant Countries’. These defined membership qualifications on administrative and financial matters, legally enabling the 2015 expansion.

With the preparatory work largely completed and the conditions for expansion in place, in 2015, during Russia’s presidency of the SCO, the SCO Heads of State Council held its 15th meeting in Ufa and issued the ‘Ufa Declaration’, announcing the commencement of the expansion process. India and Pakistan were to be formally included as member states according to the plan. Subsequently, drawing on the successful experience of the first round of expansion, and in recognition of the increasing influence and attractiveness of the SCO as its scale expanded, the organization completed the second round of expansion in 2020 by admitting Iran. In 2024, Belarus joined, marking the completion of the third round of expansion. As of now, the total area of SCO member states exceeds 35 million square kilometers, covering 65% of the Eurasian landmass, with a population of approximately 3.5 billion, nearly half of the world’s total population.

Regarding the reasons for the successful expansion of SCO membership, existing studies have mostly analyzed the promotion of the two countries’ membership expansion from the respective perspectives of the two leading countries, China and Russia, due to their geo-economic and political game needs 1^, . This makes the decision to expand membership only seem to be a ‘coincidence’ between China and Russia out of tacit understanding. However, it is difficult to explain why China and Russia have tacit understanding on the issue of including India and Pakistan in the first round of expansion, ignoring the problems and risks that the tense relations between China, India and Pakistan will challenge the consensus principle of the SCO, and then threaten the efficiency of cooperation. This seems to indicate that the expansion of SCO is not in line with the balance between costs and benefits and is contrary to rational choice. However, the fact that the first round of expansion took place and led to the subsequent two rounds of expansion also shows that there must be a logic in line with the rational choice of the state, which is worthy of in-depth study.

A systematic analysis of SCO’s first membership expansion confirms that China–Russia cooperation is a key driving force. Their joint promotion based on shared interests, risk management capabilities and strategic docking benefits all demonstrate the high-level coordination of their relations, which has facilitated and ensured SCO’s expansion.

First, at the global multilateral level, China and Russia have a common need to jointly build a new international political and economic order in the face of the institutional cooperation system led by the U.S. and the West that is increasingly out of touch with the international political reality, and the SCO is the most powerful starting point for the two countries. After the expansion, SCO can participate in global governance on a larger scale and expand the international influence of cross-regional organizations. Taking the first round of membership expansion as an example, after the accession of two major South Asian countries, India and Pakistan, the total population of SCO Member States accounted for 44% of the world’s total population, forming four kinds of dialogue among civilizations. The total land area accounts for nearly half of the world’s land area, covering about four-fifths of the Eurasian continent. The total GDP accounts for more than 20% of the global total, including China, Russia and India, the three major emerging economies. SCO includes China and Russia as well as major powers in Central Asia and South Asia, including four nuclear states. Whether in terms of political, military and economic strength, the expanded SCO has become a major force in maintaining world peace and stability. In addition, the expanded SCO has promoted the links between different political systems across ideology. As a democratic representative of Western identity, India’s accession to the organization exemplifies the openness and inclusiveness, responds to the legitimacy of western public opinion once questioned that SCO is a ‘collective authoritarian state’, proving that it is ‘a highly pragmatic and interest driven organization, not an ideological product’. In general, the promotion of the overall image and international influence of the organization from the strategic perspective is the common demand of China and Russia in their respective development process, and the common interest of Member States. Therefore, it is the initial consensus reached by all parties in the process of promoting the expansion of membership between China and Russia.

Secondly, at the level of regional substantive cooperation, as two major powers in the Eurasian region, China and Russia have the common responsibility to jointly promote regional development and maintain regional stability. The SCO is the soundest framework existing between the two countries. The expansion of SCO membership provides more additional avenues for solving regional problems. At the beginning of its establishment, the SCO’s regional concerns were mainly centered on Central Asian issues 2. The security and economic development of the four Central Asian countries also rely heavily on the SCO platform. China and Russia are regional powers, and the stability and development of Central Asia are also related to their own interests. Therefore, from the perspective of China–Russia cooperation, by assessing the needs of India and Pakistan to apply for admission to the Group and the strength of China and Russia to jointly manage the differences between India and Pakistan, it can be judged that the entry of India and Pakistan not only provides risk management channels for relevant countries, but also enriches the development options of Central Asian member states.

In addition to dealing with the anti-terrorism issues in Afghanistan and the region, strengthening the ‘connectivity’ with Central Asia and enhancing its influence in Central Asia are the primary interests of India’s accession to SCO 3 4. For a long time, the significance of Central Asia to India had four aspects: geostrategy, convenient transportation, energy security and non-traditional security buffer zone 5. To some extent, joining the SCO is also one of the ways for India to seek participation in Central Asian affairs. Central Asian countries seek cooperation with India and Pakistan. Their accession diversifies power dynamics, easing Central Asia’s balancing pressures. Additionally, their vast markets and industries boost regional growth, while Indian Ocean access opens new trade routes. India’s economic strength and investment drive support regional trade and energy projects. Though expansion slightly hinders SCO’s efficiency, risks remain manageable under China–Russia cooperation. India and Pakistan’s entry strengthens SCO’s regional influence, providing resources for Central Asia’s development.

Finally, China and Russia also linked their respective strategic resources and responded directly to the problem that the expansion of the SCO membership may slow down the efficiency of cooperation. In 2015, China and Russia signed ‘The Joint Statement on the Docking Cooperation Between the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union’. The statement stressed that China and Russia support each other’s strategic vision, and Russia is willing to work with China to carry out the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and promote the implementation of the initiative. China actively cooperates with Russia in economic and trade efforts to advance Eurasian Economic Union integration. Emphasizing ‘complementarity of integration mechanisms’ and ‘openness to Asian and European stakeholders’, it highlights cooperation through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, especially the SCO.

For the first time, the SCO is positioned as a ‘docking platform’, enhancing institutional coordination. By aligning strategic initiatives, China and Russia provide ‘functional compensation’ for regional development, addressing concerns over expansion inefficiencies – a key factor in SCO’s membership growth. To sum up, the expansion of the SCO is a close cooperation based on the common demand of both sides to establish a new international political and economic order under the premise of the high-level development of China–Russia relations. The collective decision of the organization through consensus is the result of a comprehensive consideration of the benefits of the system. It involves not only the new resources that may be obtained by the organization after the new members join under the premise of China–Russia cooperation and control of risks, but also the strategic guarantee that China and Russia provide sustainable development resources for the region through their respective strategic docking and coordination and expanding channels.

The structural divergence between China and Russia within the SCO constitutes a classic dilemma for the bloc. As founding members and core drivers, China and Russia share the goal of maintaining the SCO’s existence and overall stability. However, their differing visions for the organization’s core function create a binary tension between ‘security-first’ and ‘economy-first’ priorities.

Traditionally, Russia has focused more on building the SCO as a regional security architecture centered on security cooperation, such as counter-terrorism, military exercises, and security mechanism building. This approach aims to address terrorism, separatism, and extremism in and around Central Asia. Furthermore, Russia tends to shape the SCO into a more exclusive, quasi-military alliance-like security organization to counterbalance Western, particularly NATO, influence 6.

In contrast, China increasingly promotes a deeper transformation of the SCO towards economic cooperation, including trade and investment facilitation, connectivity, and development agendas. China envisions the SCO as a crucial platform for serving the Belt and Road Initiative and promoting regional economic integration. It tends to advance the economic agenda within the SCO, developing it into a platform for regional economic cooperation, trade connectivity, such as alignment with the Belt and Road, and soft security cooperation. China is cautious about militarizing the SCO or turning it into an anti-Western alliance.

In terms of functional scope, the SCO has expanded from ‘traditional/non-traditional security’ to a composite agenda of ‘security–economy–governance’. In its strategic role, it has evolved from an initial ‘issue-oriented mechanism’ for resolving border and security threats to a strategic platform for major powers to engage in ‘regional order building’. This evolution reflects both the changing needs of member states and the practical logic of leading states aligning their own strategic agendas with multilateral mechanisms. While both sides share a strategic consensus on jointly balancing external influence and promoting a ‘non-Western’ vision of regional order, there exists underlying tension regarding specific regional agendas, such as coordination with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the distribution of influence. This highlights the inherent limitations of the SCO as a ‘platform for major power coordination’. Its effectiveness depends not only on the common interests of member states but is also constrained by the interest games and differing priorities among the major member states 7.

The underlying balancing logic behind the SCO’s inclusion of countries like India and Pakistan touches on the core issues of ‘institutional overlap’ and ‘institutional competition’ in contemporary regionalism. The expansion of the SCO may, on the one hand, enhance its regional representativeness and legitimacy. On the other hand, it may increase internal negotiation costs by introducing new bilateral contradictions, such as India-Pakistan relations, leading to ‘institutional overload’ or reduced decision-making efficiency 7.

Despite the long-standing and complex bilateral friction between India and Pakistan (particularly regarding the Kashmir issue), the SCO, as a regional multilateral mechanism, is not designed to directly resolve such fundamental bilateral disputes. Instead, it provides a platform for the two countries to alleviate tensions, engage in limited cooperation, and gradually build trust 8.

Despite the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan, both countries maintain joint participation and relatively stable interaction within the framework of the SCO. In contrast, bilateral relations within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have been consistently tense since 2019, with a significant decline in willingness to interact, leading to a prolonged stagnation of summit meetings. Within SAARC, India and Pakistan, as dominant member states, tend to adopt relatively independent, self-interest-centered strategies, which affects the advancement of overall regional cooperation. Within the SCO framework, however, they exhibit a higher tendency towards cooperation. The logic for this behavior stems from two main factors: first, the SCO offers India and Pakistan substantive regional interests that transcend bilateral disputes, including shared concerns such as energy security (particularly the common demand for Central Asian energy resources), regional connectivity projects, and counter-terrorism cooperation; second, the SCO includes influential leading members such as China and Russia. Their roles help impose a degree of institutional constraint on the bilateral India-Pakistan conflict and steer the organizational agenda towards broader regional security governance and economic collaboration, thereby encouraging more cooperative stances from India and Pakistan during participation. This does not mean the SCO can resolve the fundamental differences between India and Pakistan, but rather illustrates that in different institutional environments characterized by varying structures and interest orientations, the same pair of bilateral states may exhibit significantly different behavioral patterns 9.

The SCO is currently at a critical turning point, with its operational effectiveness being constrained by the intensification of India–Pakistan contradictions, China–India diplomatic difficulties, and strategic divergences among major powers. India’s influence within the SCO is gradually being marginalized, reflecting the difficulty in balancing its strategic cooperation with Western allies and effective engagement in a multilateral mechanism led by China within a regional framework. At the SCO Defense Ministers’ meeting on June 25, 2025, India’s attempt to include the April 2025 Pahalgam attack incident in the joint communiqué was rejected, indicating a limited ability to garner multilateral support for its issue narratives. In contrast, Pakistan successfully advocated for the inclusion of concerns regarding instability in Balochistan, highlighting differences in the acceptance of various narrative frameworks within the SCO. China tends to support Pakistan’s narrative within the organization and promotes a more active role for Iran, which is seen as a sign of the SCO’s internal strategic tendency evolving in an ‘anti-Western’ direction. India’s opposition to the organization’s condemnation of Israeli actions (the Israeli airstrikes on Iranian territory that occurred on June 13, 2025, the Israeli military action targeted multiple sites inside Iran, including what was described as nuclear energy infrastructure) further diverges from this ‘consensus’. India finds it challenging to maintain effective cooperation simultaneously with its strategic allies (such as the U.S. and other Western countries) within the SCO, leading to its gradual marginalization in the China-led multilateral framework. India’s choice not to utilize the SCO platform to advance its counter-terrorism claims (as after the Pahalgam incident) has been interpreted as India’s perception of the framework’s limited utility for its core security issues. The SCO’s internal contradictions, primarily the persistent India–Pakistan rivalry and China–India diplomatic differences, are hindering the organization's effective functioning, showing signs of fatigue, especially in advancing common security agendas like counter-terrorism cooperation. If this status quo continues, the SCO risks becoming a ‘stage’ for India–Pakistan conflict rather than a genuine platform for multilateral security cooperation, thereby weakening its efficacy as a regional security mechanism. For the SCO to maintain its relevance and practical effectiveness, it needs to play a constructive role in addressing disputes such as those between India and Pakistan.

Furthermore, although the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as dialogue partners, does not directly constitute a contradiction among SCO member states, the prolonged security instability in the South Caucasus region has a spillover effect on broader regional cooperation mechanisms. Against the backdrop of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, security risks in the region, transmitted through geopolitical structures, energy corridors, and strategic networks, may indirectly interfere with the coordination between the SCO and Central Asian security issues, increasing the complexity and uncertainty of the organization’s cross-regional security coordination 10.

Since 2017, membership expansion has been a key aspect of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s development. Research on this process aims not only to examine its trajectory and motivations but also to clarify the driving forces behind it, facilitating SCO’s future growth. Notably, such discussions presuppose sustained high-level China–Russia cooperation.

In addition to the first round of membership expansion cases selected in this paper, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has experienced two rounds of membership expansion since then. The SCO has 10 official members and is a transregional organization centered on Eurasia. Since its founding, China–Russia high-level relations have driven its development. Some scholars suggest a ‘troika’ of China, Russia, and India after India’s accession, but it remains unmatched by the consistent momentum of China–Russia strategic cooperation. SCO expansion reflects their shared goal of shaping a new global political and economic order. It serves as a dynamic reserve for order construction rather than an end. After three rounds of accumulation, the coordinated development within the organization and the improvement of quality and efficiency will become the development goals of the next stage. It is reported that after Belarus, the issue of the next SCO membership will not be on the agenda of the organization. This is in line with the objective law of the development of international organizations and shows the further development trend after the expansion of membership under the above three reasons. The orderly promotion of organizational expansion under the coordination of China and Russia has accumulated strength for the next step of SCO development.

The 2024 SCO summit slogan is ‘Strengthen multilateral dialogue for sustainable peace and development’. As an influential player in international relations, the expanded SCO will boost its global influence through deeper Member State cooperation, advancing equitable multipolarity and inclusive globalization. Sino-Russian cooperation helps manage internal differences, while new members’ resources enhance SCO’s role in Eurasian security and economic cooperation. Beyond expanding regional cooperation via the ‘Belt and Union’ docking, China and Russia will align foreign policies and build a Eurasian security framework based on equality and indivisible security, reinforcing SCO’s role in regional security.

This paper analyzes the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization within the framework of high-level China–Russia strategic cooperation, highlighting its strategic motivations and profound impact on regional security and economic collaboration. China and Russia have demonstrated strong coordination in the SCO’s development, particularly in advancing its expansion. From an institutional perspective, this process reflects a comprehensive assessment of their strategic interests, balancing the benefits of collective decision-making, integrating new members’ resources, and maintaining organizational efficiency and stability.

In essence, whether through joint promotion driven by common interests, risk management capabilities, or strategic alignment benefits, China–Russia high-level coordination has been instrumental in facilitating and safeguarding the SCO expansion. This process underscores the deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia within the evolving global political and economic landscape. Looking ahead, as Sino-Russian cooperation continues to strengthen, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is poised to play an increasingly significant role in global governance, contributing to the restructuring of the international order and the promotion of regional stability and sustainable development.