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 <front>
  <journal-meta>
   <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">afjournal</journal-id>
   <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title xml:lang="ru">Анализ и прогноз. Журнал ИМЭМО РАН</journal-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="en">
     <trans-title>Analysis &amp; Forecasting. Journal of IMEMO</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </journal-title-group>
   <issn pub-type="epub">2713-170X</issn>
   <publisher>
    <publisher-name xml:lang="ru">ИМЭМО РАН</publisher-name>
   </publisher>
  </journal-meta>
  <article-meta>
   <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.20542/afij-2021-2-38-48</article-id>
   <article-categories>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
     <subject>Research Article</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru">
     <subject>Статьи</subject>
    </subj-group>
   </article-categories>
   <title-group>
    <article-title xml:lang="ru">Увязывание бюджетных ассигнований ЕС с соблюдением верховенства права: пример Польши и Венгрии</article-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="en">
     <trans-title>Linking EU Budget Allocations to the Rule of Law: the Case of Poland and Hungary</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </title-group>
   <aff-alternatives id="aff-1">
    <aff xml:lang="ru">
     <institution>КУВАЛДИН Станислав Аркадьевич, кандидат исторических наук, научный сотрудник сектора исследований Европейского союза Центра европейских исследований.
Национальный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений им. Е.М. Примакова РАН, РФ, 117997 Москва, ул. Профсоюзная, 23 ( kuvaldin35@gmail.com ), ORCID: 0000-0001-9042-0516 .</institution>
    </aff>
    <aff id="aff-1-en-1" xml:lang="en">
     <institution>Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation</institution>
    </aff>
   </aff-alternatives>
   <contrib-group>
    <contrib contrib-type="author" id="author-1" corresp="yes">
     <name-alternatives>
      <name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru">
       <surname>Кувалдин</surname>
       <given-names>Станислав Аркадьевич</given-names>
      </name>
      <name name-style="western" xml:lang="en">
       <surname>Kuvaldin</surname>
       <given-names>Stanislav</given-names>
      </name>
     </name-alternatives>
     <bio xml:lang="ru">
      <p>Образование:

Московский государственный университет им. М.В. Ломоносова, исторический ф-т (1999)
кандидат исторических наук, диссертация «Завершающий этап общественно-политического кризиса в Польше 1986–1989 гг. Переговоры власти и оппозиции» (2011)

Сфера научных интересов: история, экономика и политическое развитие Польши, углеродное регулирование и климатическая политика.
Автор более 10 публикаций, включая монографию.</p>
     </bio>
     <bio xml:lang="en">
      <p>Education:

Moscow Lomonosov State University, Faculty of History (alumni 1999)
PhD in History at Institute of Slavic Studies (Russian Science Academy), the thesis «The Final Stage of Socio-politiical crisis in Poland in 1986–1989. The Negotiations of Authorities and Opposition» (2011)

Field of research: history, economy and political development of Poland, Carbon regulations and Climate policy.
Author of more than 10 publications, including monograph.</p>
     </bio>
     <email>kuvaldin@imemo.ru</email>
     <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"></xref>
     <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1-en-1"></xref>
    </contrib>
   </contrib-group>
   <pub-date pub-type="epub">
    <day>20</day>
    <month>08</month>
    <year>2021</year>
   </pub-date>
   <issue>2</issue>
   <fpage>38</fpage>
   <lpage>48</lpage>
   <permissions>
    <copyright-statement xml:lang="ru">© Кувалдин С.А., 2021
Статья поступила в редакцию 29.03.2021.
Статья принята редакцией 22.06.2021.</copyright-statement>
    <copyright-statement xml:lang="en">© Stanislav А. KUVALDIN, 2021
Received 29.03.2021.
Accepted 22.06.2021.</copyright-statement>
    <copyright-year>2021</copyright-year>
    <copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Кувалдин С.А.</copyright-holder>
    <copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kuvaldin S.</copyright-holder>
   </permissions>
   <self-uri xlink:href="https://www.afjournal.ru/2021/2/regional-integration-studies/linking-eu-budget-allocations-to-the-rule-of-law-the-case-of-poland-and-hungary">https://www.afjournal.ru/2021/2/regional-integration-studies/linking-eu-budget-allocations-to-the-rule-of-law-the-case-of-poland-and-hungary</self-uri>
   <abstract>
    <p>В статье рассматривается вопрос возможного увязывания предоставления выплат из бюджета Европейского союза с соблюдением принципов верховенства закона государствами-членами. Показано, как беспокойство по поводу соблюдения принципов верховенства права в странах – участницах ЕС Польше и Венгрии привело к появлению механизма подобной обусловленности Многолетним финансовым планом ЕС на период 2021–2027 гг. Это отражает тенденцию переноса инструментов, использующихся при выстраивании внешних отношений ЕС, в сферу внутреннего управления. Однако расплывчатые формулировки потенциального механизма применения бюджетных санкций показывают нерешительность руководящих структур Евросоюза, сталкивающихся с необходимостью получить одобрение своих действий со стороны государств-членов.</p>
   </abstract>
   <trans-abstract xml:lang="en">
    <p>The article discusses the possible introduction of the rule-of-law conditionality, linking the provision of payments from the EU budget with the observance of the principles of the rule of law by the Member States. It is noted that some other tools previously used to achieve integrity of values in the EU have proved to be inefficient. In particular, all attempts to impose sanctions provided for by Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union for violating the principles of the rule of law against Poland and Hungary have not yet led to any result. At the same time, one can see how different conditionalities for receiving funds or other benefits from the EU are becoming an increasingly common internal EU governance mechanism, although initially this tool was used mainly in building external relations. It should be noted that the possibility of budgetary sanctions is spelled out in the draft budget, but the mechanism for their introduction is not precisely defined. This is partly due to the need to reach a consensus at the EU summit, which agreed on the budget in July 2020. European leaders opted for vague language for the budget sanctions mechanism to be approved in principle. This once again shows the complexity of making tough decisions within the EU. Nevertheless, one can see the consistent actions of European structures and Member States to provide a new mechanism for the protection of European values. The economic nature of this mechanism, as well as its relative effectiveness in other areas, may increase the interest of a number of EU Member States in it. This creates a potential risk for the authorities of Poland and Hungary, which may lose some of the subsidies from the EU. However, it cannot be ruled out that the EU approach of seeking a compromise will prevail even after a new sanctions instrument appears at its disposal.</p>
   </trans-abstract>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="ru">
    <kwd>Европейский союз</kwd>
    <kwd>Польша</kwd>
    <kwd>Венгрия</kwd>
    <kwd>общий бюджет ЕС</kwd>
    <kwd>санкции</kwd>
    <kwd>верховенство закона</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="en">
    <kwd>European Union</kwd>
    <kwd>Poland</kwd>
    <kwd>Hungary</kwd>
    <kwd>sanctions</kwd>
    <kwd>EU budget</kwd>
    <kwd>rule of law conditionality</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
   <custom-meta-group>
    <custom-meta>
     <meta-name>UDK</meta-name>
     <meta-value>336.14:339.7(438)+(439)</meta-value>
    </custom-meta>
   </custom-meta-group>
  </article-meta>
 </front>
 <back>
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  <fn-group>
   <fn fn-type="conflict">
    <p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p>
   </fn>
  </fn-group>
 </back>
</article>
